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I.  Introduction 
  A notable feature of many trade agreements in the post World War II era is the gradual, rather 
than immediate, reduction of trade barriers.  For example, European, Japanese and U.S. average tariffs 
have declined by over 90 percent since the first GATT round.  These gradual reductions are partly 
attributable to deeper tariff cuts in successive GATT rounds, partly attributable to an increase in the types 
of trade barriers addressed by the GATT and partly attributable to an expansion in the number of sectors 
covered by the GATT.  Furthermore, starting with the Kennedy round negotiations, new tariff reductions 
were given an explicit phase-in period.  Many regional and bilateral agreements exhibit these same 
incremental reductions and well-detailed phase-in periods.
1 
  Because of their smaller scale, bilateral trade agreements allow us to more clearly see the gradual 
increase in economic integration that may be generating these incremental reductions.  For example, 
recent trade agreements with Canada, Israel and Mexico were preceded, if not initiated, by an unilateral 
reduction in U.S. tariffs levied against the prospective partner.  As a result of this conventional 
unilateralism these countries increasingly oriented their exports toward the U.S. and were, therefore, more 
susceptible to a subsequent increase in aggressive unilateralism (increased use of anti-dumping duties, 
countervailing measures and safeguard actions) by the U.S.  The free trade agreement essentially 
constituted a reciprocation of the U.S. tariff reductions along with a promise of further concessions by 
both parties.  The U.S.-Israel free trade agreement provides a straightforward example.  The agreement 
called for the removal of all tariffs and many other forms of protection over the course of a ten-year 
period beginning with implementation on September 1, 1985.  The U.S. tariff reductions were quick, and 
relatively easy, with many Israeli goods already entering the U.S. duty free under the U.S. Generalized 
                                                 
1 In Mercosur, for example, which was formed on March 26, 1991, tariffs levied by Argentina and Brazil were to 
decline by sixty-one percent by June 30, 1992 and by one-hundred percent by December 31, 1994.  Paraguay and 
Uruguay were given an additional phase in year.  In addition to the covered sectors, the treaty outlined plans for 
harmonization on intellectual property protection and foreign direct investment and found the possibility of future 
harmonization on anti-dumping duties and countervailing measures to be desirable.  For more on Mercosur, see 
Rowat et al (1997).   2
System of Preferences.
2  The first order of the agreement was, therefore, essentially a reciprocating 
reduction in Israel’s tariffs against U.S. imports.  In response, the U.S. was to curb its use of aggressive 
unilateralism.  Israel would then liberalize some of its licensing procedures.  Furthermore, a nonbinding 
commitment to liberalize trade in services between the partners was part of the U.S.-Israel agreement. 
  As illustrated above, there is a similarity in the gradual steps that were taken in large multilateral 
agreements, such as the GATT, and in many regional and bilateral agreements.  In the bilateral 
agreements, we also see an example of the mechanism that could lead to this gradualism process:  Initial 
tariff reductions may lead to a growing interdependence between the trading partners. 
  In this paper, we develop a simple model that addresses these stylized facts.  Trade liberalization 
emerges as a cooperative relationship that evolves gradually in a non-cooperative environment.  Our point 
of departure is the explicit recognition of the non-stationary aspect of the trading environment.  In 
particular, we show that specialization and the development of trade-partner specific capital increase the 
benefit of continuing the liberalizing relationship and decrease, over time, the lowest obtainable self-
enforcing tariff.  
  The idea here is that each country must alter, or augment, its production process to realize the 
benefits of a trade agreement.  These alterations may arise from increased output in an export sector, they 
may fit exports to the importing country’s standards or they may involve network and sales infrastructure 
development in the importing country.  Once the alteration cost is sunk, the value of continuing the 
liberalized trading relationship increases.  For example, specialization in an export sector greatly reduces 
the elasticity of export supply and, in a non-cooperative equilibrium, greatly increases the optimal tariff 
that can be levied against the specializing country.  If only one country makes an alteration, that country 
is exposed to opportunism and, foreseeing this possibility, production transformation and trade 
                                                 
2 Israel’s accession to the GATT, as part of the agreement, and its subsequent receipt of MFN status further reduced 
the number of Israeli exports subject to U.S. tariffs.  Approximately eighty percent of Israeli exports to the U.S. and 
fifty percent of U.S. exports to Israel entered duty free on the agreement’s inception.  Naturally, the most sensitive 
sectors had the longest phase in periods.  For more on the U.S.-Israel free trade agreement, see Rosen (1989).   3
liberalization are limited.
3  If both countries make alterations, then each proceed slowly, however, once it 
has been verified that the alteration costs are sunk, each party agrees to a greater degree of liberalization.  
By relaxing the incentive constraints, a larger degree of cooperation is sustainable.  Put another way, by 
increasing the penalty of future defection, sunk costs ensure that the self-enforcing trading relationship 
starts slowly, but once in progress the level of cooperation continues to progress. 
  We consider dynamically optimal tariffs in a model of two symmetric economies.  Our key 
assumption is the irreversibility of capacity accumulation in the export sector.  Factor allocation in each 
period, therefore, is determined by the expected terms of trade and by the previous period allocations.   
Our first result shows that if capacity reversibility is sufficiently slow, or costly, then, irrespective 
of the discount rate, free trade cannot be self-enforcing in the initial period of the trade agreement.  A 
smaller tariff reduction is self-enforcing and in response to this tariff reduction additional factors begin to 
accumulate in the export sector.  We, therefore, next characterize a set of equilibria where tariffs decline 
over time and, if governments are sufficiently patient, then the tariffs converge to the free trade 
cooperative outcome.  An interesting feature of the model, here, is that, when capacity is sufficiently 
irreversible, tariff reductions must exhibit gradualism if they are reduced at all.  In these equilibria, future 
liberalization depends on past successes and on the expectation of future gains.  
  We also show how the obtainable tariff outcomes are affected by changes in the extent of 
capacity irreversibility and by changes in our index of the appropriable gains from trade.  First, we 
demonstrate that an increase in the extent of capacity irreversibility (i.e. if capacity reversibility becomes 
slower, or more costly) makes it more difficult to start a new trade agreement but makes it easier to 
sustain a well-established one.  That is, an increase in capacity irreversibility raises the deviation 
                                                 
3 Although tariff revenue was, historically, an important concern of trade policy makers, it appears to be of 
secondary importance, in industrialized countries, in the modern era.  A natural response to this fact is to question 
the fear of opportunism as an explanation behind the development of recent trade agreements.  (For some fascinating 
historical accounts of opportunism in trade relationships see McLaren, 1997).  Whether the tariff levied against an 
increasingly specialized country is raised because of opportunism and tariff revenue concerns or is raised  in 
response to domestic lobbyists demanding greater protection from growing import penetration is immaterial.  The 
specializing country need only note that the tariff that prevails if the trade agreement fails is increasing in import   4
incentive in a new trading relationship but raises the cost of a trade war by a greater amount in a 
developed one.  Second, we clarify that in the standard case, when capacity is instantly reversible, an 
increase in the gains from trade has an ambiguous effect on tariff outcomes.  This result occurs because 
an increase in the gains from trade raises the incentive to deviate from the free trade agreement, but it also 
raises the cost of the future trade war that is generated by this deviation.  Third, we establish that if the 
extent of irreversibility is sufficiently high, then an increase in the gains from trade decreases the cost of a 
future trade war as well.  Hence, the lowest obtainable tariff must increase and it is seen that an increase 
in the gains from trade can perversely retard the gradualism process. 
Finally, in characterizing the tariff path, we obtain a gradual counterpart to stationary folk 
theorem results:  The speed of tariff liberalization is increasing in the discount factor.  Put another way, if 
countries place a higher value on future payoffs, then the magnitude of tariff cuts is greater and the 
number of rounds of tariff reductions needed for free trade to obtain is reduced. 
This paper is divided into six sections.  The next section reviews the related literature.  The third 
section develops the basic model and examines the stationary outcomes.  The fourth section shows how 
gradualism occurs in a specific case.  The fifth section provides general conditions under which 
gradualism can occur and examines the gradual tariff path.  The sixth section concludes and suggests 
possibilities for further extensions.  Proofs of the more technical propositions are available upon request 
from the author. 
II.  Related Literature 
Johnson (1953) was the first to consider tariff retaliation and a trade-war equilibrium.  Mayer 
(1981) used the Nash-equilibrium trade war as a threat point in a cooperative approach to characterizing 
trade agreements.  The most famous result from Mayer’s paper was that, because country size can 
determine the threat point, a large country may prefer a trade war over free trade with a small country.  
Put another way, the large country may need to be bribed to accept free trade.   
                                                                                                                                                             
penetration.  In our model, as in many common frameworks, this is, in fact, the case.   5
In McLaren (1997), which is an important extension of Mayer’s cooperative approach, factor 
allocation precedes a trade agreement.  Because governments can give side payments, agents do not 
internalize the erosion in national bargaining power caused by their actions.  If free trade is expected, then 
factors will accumulate in the export sector causing an increase in the optimal tariff that can be levied 
against this country.  In this case, the resulting side payment in the trade agreement may be so large as to 
leave the country worse off under an optimistic expectation of free trade than under an expectation of a 
trade war.   
Lapan (1988) was the first to formally recognize that the optimal tariff after production has 
occurred is greater than the ex-ante optimal tariff.
4  Internalizing this time inconsistency in tariff setting 
can lead to lower output levels and leave both countries worse off.   
  A potential limitation of analyzing trade agreements with a cooperative game theoretic approach 
is the lack of an international agency with true enforcement capability.  Recognizing this fact, authors 
such as Dixit (1987) and Bagwell and Staiger (1990, 1997) began to look at trade agreements as self-
enforcing outcomes in a repeated game framework. 
Staiger (1995) explicitly considered gradual tariff reductions.  In his paper, gradualism arises 
from the presence of rent-earning factors that are displaced by trade liberalization.  Each successive round 
of trade liberalization displaces a small percentage of factors in the import competing industry.  If these 
factors lose their rent-earning skill, which occurs with some exogenous probability, then they will have no 
rents to protect in subsequent liberalization rounds and further tariff cuts can occur.  In a related vein, 
Furusawa and Lai (1998) showed that gradualism can arise if there are adjustment costs in moving 
                                                 
4 Lapan’s result is for national income maximizing tariffs.  Staiger and Tabellini (1987) demonstrated a similar time 
inconsistency in setting politically optimal tariffs:  Governments announce a low tariff to encourage workers to 
move out of the import-competing sector, but ex-post set a higher tariff to avoid adjustment costs.     6
workers in and out of the import-competing sector.
5   
In Devereux (1997), learning-by-doing augments the increased export-sector output afforded by 
liberalization to generate a reduction in production costs.  These lowered costs, in turn, increase the 
benefit to consumers of further liberalization.  Firms specialize immediately, therefore, gradualism arises 
only because the threat of a trade war becomes increasingly unfavorable to consumers.
6  
Bond and Park (forthcoming) also looked at gradualism arising from time-inconsistency in tariff 
setting by a large country.  There are no capacity irreversibilities in their framework, therefore, the 
economic environment looks the same in every period.  In contrast to ours, and all of the other gradualism 
frameworks, it is not the evolution of a state variable that drives the gradualism result.  Gradualism arises 
instead because the small country desires to smooth consumption over time.  The trade agreement may, 
therefore, stipulate higher tariffs in initial periods and lower tariffs with larger side payments from the 
small to the large country in later periods.   
Our approach extends this literature in the following way.  Unlike Staiger and Furusawa and Lai, 
who model further tariff reductions as arising from a reduced import competing sector, we, like Devereux, 
model gradualism as arising from economic integration and increasing interdependence between the 
trading partners.  In our model, however, it is not consumers so much as producers that become more 
dependent on trade liberalization.  It is the increasing export orientation of producers, here, that leads 
countries to lower tariffs in successive negotiating rounds.  Finally, we analyze how changes in capacity 
                                                 
5 Adjustment costs and the presence of rent earning factors in the import sector provide a useful approach to 
understanding the slow pace of trade liberalization, however, we believe that there are additional dynamic forces at 
work in the structure of trade agreements and we propose an alternative theory of gradualism that captures some of 
these effects.  For example, after Mexico signed a trade liberalization agreement with the U.S. it quickly signed 
another with France.  If the fear of initially displacing too many rent-earning factors was the main impetus behind 
the gradual tariff reductions written into NAFTA, then signing another trade agreement would not alleviate this 
factor displacement.  
6 Our model is concerned with irreversibilities, and does not pretend to capture Devereux’s sophisticated change in 
the gains from trade.  Our admittedly simplistic, and reduced form, index of this change, however, suggests that the 
Devereux effect may be mitigated when capacity is highly irreversible.     7
irreversibility, the gains from trade and the discount factor affect the obtainable tariff outcomes.
 7 
Finally we wish to acknowledge the work of several researchers who showed that gradualism in 
unilateral trade liberalization may be national welfare maximizing for a country with domestic market 
imperfections.  Mussa (1986) demonstrated the superiority of gradualism when adjustment costs are 
convex in the number of workers leaving the import-competing sector.  Lapham (1995) finds a similar 
result in a dynamic monopolistic competition model with convex adjustment costs.  Mehlum (1998) 
shows that gradual tariff reductions may improve welfare in a Ramsey type model encompassing 
Heckscher-Ohlin trade when a minimum wage is introduced (so that tariff reductions can cause 
transitional unemployment).  Falvey and Kim (1992) discuss how gradualism may be justified when a 
government has not yet established an alternative means of generating revenue.  They also note that large 
tariff reductions may not be considered credible by adjusting firms.  We complement these normative 
justifications for unilateral gradualism in the presence of domestic distortions by analyzing a positive 
explanation for bilateral gradualism that arises from international strategic considerations.        
III.  Economic Environment 
In this section, we consider an infinitely repeated tariff setting game between the governments of 
two production economies.  The model is kept simple, not only to ensure tractability, but also to 
demonstrate gradualism arising solely from the presence of irreversible investments. 
A.  Assumptions on Tastes and Technology. 
There are two symmetric economies.  Each economy contains a government, a large number of 
firms and a large number (l ) of identical agents who are each endowed with one unit of labor.  These 
agents sell their labor to the firms, and receive an equal share of the firms’ profits and of the 
                                                 
7 In a related application, Admati and Perry (1991) consider two agents who take turns making non-refundable 
contributions to a public project that is produced only if the sum of the contributions is greater than the cost.  This 
framework generates a potential hold-up problem, so that agents contribute slowly, if at all.  Our model is closer to 
what Admati and Perry refer to as the “standard formulation where the question is the scale of the public good that is 
provided.”  In their model it is all or none - although contributions are made incrementally, there is no gradualism in 
providing the public good.  Furthermore, their incremental contribution result, and possible inefficiency result would 
not obtain in the “standard formulation.”  We exhibit gradualism in an international trade version of the “standard   8
government’s tariff revenue.  They spend this income on consumption of the firms’ products.  The 
strategic possibilities of the agents and the firms is limited by their large numbers and is, therefore, 
ignored in the set of subgame-pefect equilibria that we analyze below.  Given the competitive behavior of 
the agents and the firms, each government chooses tariffs to maximize national welfare. 
Each country is identified with a good in that only firms in country x (y) have the specific factor 
necessary for profitable production of good x (y).  Gradualism, therefore, cannot arise, here, from 
employment rigidities in the import competing sector (there isn’t one).  In addition, there is a numeraire 
good (z).  The numeraire good can rectify trade imbalances and its sector can costlessly and 
instantaneously contract to provide labor for a growing export sector.  
The preferences of the identical agents, in each country, over consumption of the three goods can 
be represented by a quasilinear utility function.  We can, therefore, restrict our analysis to the aggregate 
utility function.  Letting countries be denoted by superscripts and goods by subscripts, for country i this 
utility function takes the following form:
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Good z is produced by a constant-returns-to-scale technology:  Qzt
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i is the output 
of, and  lzt
i  is the labor input to, the numeraire sector in country i in period t.  Because the labor supply is 
                                                                                                                                                             
formulation” because investments are not only sunk but also ongoing and temporarily irreversible.   9
assumed sufficiently large (to be made precise below), there is positive numeraire production in both 
countries and the wage is equal to the price of the numeraire good, which is normalized to one.   
Goods x and y require the installation of capacity (Qjt
i ) before their production is viable.  There 
is an increasing opportunity cost of adding capacity.  This cost function is quadratic and its per-period 
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where, B < A.  This capacity installation is not a one time expenditure but must be paid in every period.  
The minimum cost of producing good j in country i „ j is, therefore, greater than the maximum price at 
which demand is positive.  Hence, equation (4) formalizes the assumption that only country x (y) can 
profitably produce good x (y) in the absence of a government subsidy. 
To isolate the role of irreversible capacity investments, we assume that each industry’s marginal 
production cost is zero for output less than or equal to capacity but is infinite for output greater than 
capacity.
8  The per-period production costs are then equal to the capacity costs and the world output of 
good x (y) is equal to country x’s (y’s) capacity:  Q Q xt
x
yt
y ( ) .  The gain from international trade is, 
therefore, an increasing function of the magnitude A - B and we refer to q = A - B as an index of the 
gains from trade. 
Within a single time period, the capacity requirement is indistinguishable from a simple upward-
sloping industry supply curve and allows for a straightforward analysis and comparison of per-period 
equilibrium values.  The importance of the capacity requirement, however, is its effect between, or across, 
time periods.  In particular, we assume that capacity is irreversible for N periods after the most recent 
capacity expansion.  Equivalently, capacity cannot be reduced for N periods after the latest addition to 
capacity is made.  This assumption implies that expanding output in any single time period observably 
                                                 
8 Allowing for a positive production cost would mildly complicate the analysis without altering the results.   10
constrains output choices for the next N periods.
9  The extent of irreversibility, as measured by N, is 
shown below to influence the set of attainable trade agreement outcomes.  This assumption is stated 
formally as: 
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( ) + ‡  for N periods after the latest capacity 
expansion.  The idea here is that expanding an export sector requires the development of sector-specific 
human or physical capital.  The labor that is devoted to creating this capital is no longer available for 
numeraire production.  This cost, in terms of lost numeraire production, has to be paid whether or not the 
installed capacity is used.   
There are several ways to motivate this capacity irreversibility assumption.  The simplest assumes 
that firms have contractual obligations with their input suppliers arising, for example, from union 
contracts.  These irreversibilities may also occur because of the need to develop and maintain networks 
and sales infrastructure in the importing country.  Some of these expenses are sunk at the time of export 
expansion, however, many are also ongoing costs whose irreversibility again stems from explicit 
contracts (such as advertising, brand name and sales infrastructure maintenance) and implicit contracts 
(such as maintaining networks and political favor).  Roberts and Tybout (1997) provide evidence that, for 
Colombian firms, these costs are an important component of the decision to enter an export market.  
Finally, these sunk costs may arise from an increase in capital expenditures (such as factory size and 
                                                 
9 Our key assumption is that firms must take some observable action when they decide to reverse capacity and that 
this desired reversal is not immediate or costless.  As it would have no effect on the outcome, we choose not to 
complicate the model by the addition of an additional variable that announces this capacity reversal decision and we 
endogenize it as in equation 5.  In a related vein, it is also important that capacity is observable to the foreign 
government, for without this observable hostage gradualism would not occur.  This point is related to Bagwell 
(1995) who showed how unobservability can eradicate a first-mover advantage.  Maggi’s (1999) extension of, and 
solution to, the Bagwell effect may apply here as well if the firms’ capacity costs are private information, however, 
it would require that individual firms are willing to incur costly signaling to provide credibility to their government’s 
commitment to a low announced tariff.  Additionally, we rely on perfect observability of tariffs throughout our 
analysis.  We believe that our results would still obtain if trade protection instruments are imperfectly observed as in 
Hungerford (1991) or Reizman (1991), however, the gradualism path may be non-monotonic.  We leave the analysis 
of imperfect and incomplete information in our framework for further research.   11
machinery).  Rather than paying the full cost at the time of installation, the capital cost is amortized over 
its lifespan, therefore, the per-period cost can be considered as loan repayment.  
In addition to the firm’s capacity choice, each government can choose to levy a per-unit import 
tariff.  Given that country x exports x and imports y in any trading equilibrium, these tariffs relate the 
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j is the price of good j in country j and Pj
i  is the tariff-inclusive price 
paid by consumers in the importing country.  From this point onward, when not necessary for clarity, time 
subscripts are omitted to unclutter notation. 
The equality between world demand and supply for each good, Q D D D j j j
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with equations (2) and the above pricing relationship implicitly defines the price of each good in each 
country as: 
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Substituting equation (6) into equation (2) yields each country’s demand for good j as: 
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Equating  Pj
j to Cj
j yields the unconstrained world supply of good j as:  
Qj j
i = - [ ]/ 2 3 q t ,                  (8) 
Equations (6) through (8) are derived under the assumption of non-prohibitive tariffs, which is later 
shown to be the case in all equilibria. 
Tariffs are chosen by each government to maximize their respective country’s welfare.  Using 
equations (1 - 4) per-period welfare can be represented as the aggregate indirect utility function.  It is the 
sum of consumer surplus, producer surplus, tariff revenue and the market value of the labor endowment: 
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Country i’s imports of good j „ i equals their total demand for good j, therefore, the second-to-last term in 
equation (9) is tariff revenue.  Letting d ˛ [0, 1] represent the discount factor between periods, welfare in 
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B.  Timing. 
  In the beginning of each period firms and the government in each country observe the trade 
agreement.  The agreement specifies the most cooperative self-enforcing tariff obtainable in that period.  
We assume that firms in each country know their respective government’s tariff choice before their 
capacity decision is made.  This implies the following timing of events. 
First, tariffs are chosen simultaneously by governments in each country.  The tariffs are initially 
revealed only to the firms in each country.  Second, firms in each country simultaneously add capacity.  
The large number of firms implies that capacity is installed until its marginal cost equals the expected 
market price.  Third, tariffs and capacities are revealed and production and consumption take place.  
The above timing indicates that the public history in period t+1 is the sequence of tariffs and 
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The public history in period t+1 is H







t Q Q  and H
0 = {˘}.  Using this formalization, a 
strategically equivalent extensive form that is closer in spirit to more common, two player, games of 
almost perfect information is shown below.
10 
FIGURE 1 GOES APPROXIMATELY HERE 
                                                 
10 Tariff negotiations are often analyzed as the outcome of a simultaneous move game between the governments of 
two endowment economies.  The analysis can, therefore, draw on well-established theorems for analyzing such 
games of almost-perfect information.  The difficulty here is that: (a.) there is production in the economy and (b.) that 
capacity is irreversible.  Firms and governments, therefore, may not be coordinated in their deviation and production 
strategies.  The coordination implied by our timing assumption is, in fact, not necessary for our results.  We choose 
to focus on the case whereby a whole country deviates in the same period because we feel that this is the most 
interesting and most natural case.  Hence, firms see only their own government’s current-period tariff choice before 
they make their capacity decision.   13
Given the timing described above, the unconstrained capacity choice in each period can be 
written as a function of the other country’s expected tariff in that periodQj jt
ie ( ) t =  ( ) / 2 3 q t - jt
ie .  It is 
immediately apparent that the unconstrained capacity choice is declining in the expected tariff.  From 
equation (5) output and capacity of good j in period t are given by: 
Q
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We now turn to the depiction of the stationary tariff outcomes. 
C.  Free Trade. 
From equations (6), (7) and (8a) we see that when free trade is expected:  Q j
F = Qj(0) = 2q/3, the 
free-trade price is  P P A B j
j
j
i = = + ( ) / 2 3, and per-country consumption of each good is  D D j
j
j
i = = q/3.  
From equation (9) free-trade period-welfare is then V V Q Q
F i
i j = = ( , , ( ), ( )) / 0 0 0 0 3
2 q  + l.
11   
D.  Markov-Nash Tariffs. 
Each country’s period-optimal tariff, t
im, satisfies the following first-order-condition: 
¶ ￿
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In the absence of export taxes and subsidies, t
i = t
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j.  We use this fact to simplify notation.  From the 
expressions for Pj
i  and D j
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i i / /  so that equation (10) uniquely determines each 
country’s best-response tariff:  t
im
j Q = / 3. 
                                                 
11 Because exports are maximized and numeraire production is minimized in free trade, substituting Q
F into the total 
cost function that yielded (4) shows that positive numeraire production and a wage of one in both countries is 
ensured by l > (2A
2 + 2AB – 4B
2)/9.   14
There are four interesting things to notice about these best-response tariffs.  First, they are 
increasing in the capacity choice of the trading partner.  This indicates that the more a country is 
dependent on trade and specialized towards an export market, the higher the optimal tariff that can be 
levied against that country.  Equivalently, greater import penetration generates a more protectionist 
optimal tariff.  Second, the best response tariffs are stationary if and only if the capacity choices are 
stationary.  Third, the best-response tariffs are not a function of the other country’s tariff, therefore, they 
uniquely define the Markov-Nash-equilibrium tariffs.  Fourth, from equations (6) and (7) it is evident that 
tariffs are never high enough to choke off all trade.  Put another way, they are always below the 
prohibitive tariff level.
12 
E.  Markov-Perfect Equilibrium. 
As in a framework with fully reversible capacity, one subgame-perfect equilibrium for this 
dynamic tariff game is an infinite repetition of the static Nash equilibrium.  In this benchmark case, firms 
and governments expect a Markov-Nash tariff in every period.  These Markov-Nash tariffs are not 
conditioned on past tariff outcomes.  A subgame-perfect equilibrium in these Markovian strategies is a 
Markov-perfect equilibrium (MPE.)  If capacity is costlessly and immediately reversible, or if capacity 
is never added, then the physical environment, as described by the state variable, would look the same to 
the firms and the governments in every period.  The unique MPE in this case would be the infinite 
repetition of the static Nash equilibrium.  The irreversible capacity indicates that histories with greater 
installed capacity may generate different MPE outcomes.  We now characterize this MPE set.   
Lemma 1:  (i.)  The unique MPE after any history with no capacity additions in the previous N periods or 






j = = = 0 3 5 ( ( )) t q /  and t t t
im im = 0  = 
imim
tjt (Q()) ttq =/5  for all t.  
                                                 
12 The monotonic effect of Qj on t
im (point 1) results from our linear framework and facilitates derivation of our 
results.  That the Markov-Nash equilibrium is in strictly dominant strategies (point 3) is a result of our linear partial-
equilibrium framework and our omission of export policies.  It is not necessary for our results, however, it does 
simplify their derivation.   Point 4 indicates that autarky is not a one-shot equilibrium here.  This difference with the 
case first noted by Dixit (1987, p.335) is as follows: by not considering export taxes, we ensure that prohibitive 
tariffs cannot be an equilibrium in weakly dominated strategies.   15
(ii.)  After any other history (when capacity was last installed in period s) the unique MPE is:  
Q Q jt
m
js = ‡ Q j
m
0  ‡ Q Q j t
im
jt ( ( )) t  and t t t
im
jt
im Q ( ) ‡ 0  for t ˛ {s+1,…, s+N}.   
The proof of Lemma 1 is contained in Chisik (2001) and is available upon request from the author.  
As in the standard, reversible capacity case, free trade Pareto dominates the no trade agreement 
MPE (the unique MPE for the entire game).  To see this substitute {Qj
m im
0 0 ,t } into equation (6) and then 
equation (9) to yield period utility of V V Q Q





0 0 0 0 0
2 8 25 = = + ( , , ( ), ( )) / t t t t q l  < q
2 / 3 + l = V
F.  
The inefficiency here is a result of the asymmetric effect of a tariff on each country’s welfare.  Although a 
small tariff increases the levying country’s welfare, it decreases the trading partner’s welfare by a greater 
amount.  To see this, note that world welfare (=SiV
i(t,t,Q,Q)) is decreasing in a common tariff, t.  This 
tariff setting interaction is, therefore, reminiscent of a prisoners’ dilemma, whereby each country benefits 
from a mechanism that enforces a more cooperative outcome.  We now turn to such mechanisms. 
F.  Trade Agreement Strategies 
A common form of enforcement mechanism encountered in the literature relies upon “grim” 
strategies.  These history dependent strategies mandate that any deviation from the specified cooperative 
action will generate an infinite reversion to a punishment stage.  A credible punishment threat relies upon 
continuation payoffs from a perfect equilibrium (often the most undesirable static Nash-equilibrium.)  
Adapted to a tariff setting framework these strategies specify a most-cooperative (or lowest) self-
enforcing tariff (t
ic) as a function of the discount rate and also a punishment tariff to be levied for the 
infinite future if a country deviates from the cooperative tariff.  The punishment tariffs are often the Nash-
equilibrium tariffs and the punishment stage can be considered as a trade-war.   
The evolution of the state variable, here, naturally precludes reversion to a static Nash-
equilibrium.  A natural counterpart in stochastic games (see Ausubel and Deneckere (1987), Cave (1987) 
and Radner and Benhabib (1992)) is an infinite reversion to the worst MPE for the offending party.  By 
Lemma 1, we know that there is a unique MPE following any deviation and we can utilize this MPE in   16
describing a subgame-perfect enforcement mechanism.  Let us call these modified grim strategies as the 





++ Gﬁt  as government i’s action in period t+1.  Similarly define country i’s aggregate 




+++ xtﬁ .  Finally define a sequence of cooperative tariffs and 
capacities as t
ict = {t t 1
ic
t
ic ,..., } and Qi
t jct ( ) t  = {Q Q i
jc
i t
jc ( ),..., ( ) t t 1 }, respectively.  The trade agreement 
strategies are defined as follows: 
iic
t1t1 ++ G=t  if H
t+1 = {t
ict, t
jct, Q Q i
t jct
j




xi(t+1) =  Qi t t
jc
( )( ) + + 1 1 t  if H
t+1 = {t
ict, t
jct, Q Q i
t jct
j
t ict ( ), ( ) t t } and 
iic
t1t1 ++ G=t  
  Qi t
m
( ) +1  otherwise.                (12) 
  A potential difficulty here is the actions of the firms in the deviating country.  The trade 
agreement strategies indicate that they revert immediately to trade war actions rather than waiting until 
the following period.  Foreseeing the future retaliatory tariff that they will face, it is reasonable to expect 
that they would choose not to add capacity in the deviation period even when the cooperative tariff is 
declining in this period.  If d, or N, is small or the tariff cut is large, however, the discounted future losses 
from the excess capacity is less than the current gain and they could desire a small capacity expansion in 
the deviation period.
13  In any case, this desired increase, if it occurs at all, is generally very small, but 
allowing for its existence causes the resulting irreversible capacity to be a function of N and d.  This more 
complicated capacity expression complicates the analysis without changing the main results.  We 
therefore assume the existence of an institutional constraint that precludes firms from adding capacity in 
                                                 
13 It is shown in Chisik (2001) that the desired capacity, in the deviating country, in a deviation period is decreasing 
in N or d and increasing in the size of the tariff reduction.  Furthermore, if N or d is large, or if the tariff cut is small, 
or if the existing capacity is well above Q
m
0 , then the desired capacity does not increase at all.  It is also shown that 
allowing for these possible capacity expansions does not change the main results.  They can, however, slightly 
increase the pace of tariff liberalization.   17
the deviation period.  Formally, this constraint may be considered as a threat by their government to levy 
an export tax on any output produced by capacity added in the deviation period.  Alternatively, the 
remuneration package of the firm’s decision makers may penalize excessive unused capacity or large 
profit margin reductions. 
From the trade agreement strategies and from equation (8a), a deviating country’s capacity in the 
deviation period (s) and in the first N-1 periods of a trade war is, therefore given by: 







jc = = = - - - - ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]/ 1 1 1 2 3 t q t  for t ˛ {s,…, s+N–1}.        (8b) 
Capacity in the cooperating country is given by: 







ic = = = - ( ) [ ]/ t q t 2 3 for t ˛ {s,…, s+N}.          (8c) 
There are two forms of capacity asymmetries during a trade war.  The first, and most important, is 
that the deviating country has less installed capacity than the cooperating country.  The second is that the 
deviating country planned for the trade war one period earlier and, therefore, can remove their excess 
capacity one period earlier.  Although a reasonable by-product of our model, this second asymmetry is in 
no way necessary for our results.  Furthermore, as the extent of irreversibility (N) becomes large, this 
second asymmetry becomes vanishingly small. 
IV.  Non- -Stationary Tariffs 
A.  Irreversibility and Unenforceability of Free Trade as a Stationary Tariff Outcome. 
A notable feature of these strategies is that, when the physical environment does not change over 
time, they can support zero tariffs, or free trade, when the discount rate exceeds a critical level.  It is 
interesting to note that if capacity irreversibility is of sufficiently long duration, then free trade cannot be 
supported, here, initially, for any value of the discount factor.  To see this, we consider the extreme case 
of complete irreversibility (i.e. when N approaches infinity) and compare free trade to the asymmetric 
trade war that follows a deviation from free trade in the initial period. 
Suppose, without loss of generality, that while country y expects free trade in the initial period 
and installs capacity accordingly, country x deviates from the free-trade agreement.  Country x installs   18
only Qx
m
0 and faces a trade-war tariff of t0
ym .  Country x levies a tariff of t
xm(Qy(0)) = 2q / 9.  Using these 





ym), Qy(0)) = 451q
2 / 1350 + l > q
2 / 3 + l =V
F.  The asymmetric trade war generates 
greater welfare for country x than does free trade.
14  The punishment, in this case, is certainly no 
punishment at all.  Put another way, the potential for opportunism is too great and there is no credible 
deterrent.  It is, therefore, seen that when starting from an initial period, without a trade agreement, free-
trade cannot be obtained in a single period.  We state this above argument concisely as proposition 1: 
Proposition 1:  If countries follow trade agreement strategies, and if there is complete irreversibility, 
then for all discount factors d  £ 1, t
F = 0 is not a stationary tariff outcome. 
When N is finite, free trade may be initially self-enforcing if the discount factor is sufficiently 
high.  As shown in the next section, however, the critical discount factor that permits this outcome is an 
increasing function of N.  For an intuitive explanation, note that a deviating country receives the higher 
asymmetric trade war payoff for the first N periods of a trade war and receives the lower no trade 
agreement payoff after that.  As N increases, the undesirable part of the trade war occurs further in the 
future and a higher discount factor is required to deter this opportunistic behavior.   
It is reasonable to expect that governments (or, at least, elected policy makers) have a relatively 
short expected time horizon and, therefore, place a low value on future payoffs so that free trade is 
                                                 
14 That one country may prefer a trade war to free trade was also shown by Johnson (1953), Mayer (1981), Kennan 
and Riezman (1988), and McLaren (1997), among others.  In each of these previous analyses exogenous 
asymmetries in country size yield this result rather than solely the endogenous capacity asymmetries as in the 
present case.  Furthermore, this result is not dependant on our assumed functional forms.  For example, in a 
Ricardian model with two goods, country x’s Markov-tariff levied on imports from a specialized country y is 
extremely high.  For reasonable elasticities of substitution and magnitudes of comparative advantage, country x 
would prefer an opportunistic asymmetric trade war over free trade in this case as well.   19
initially not self-enforcing even when irreversibility is of short duration.
15  In these cases, free trade, if 
obtained at all, must come about gradually. We now turn our attention to gradual liberalization outcomes. 
B.  Gradualism with Complete Irreversibility. 
When free trade is not initially enforceable, tariffs lower than the no trade agreement MPE are 
self-enforcing.  What is new, here, is that these lower tariffs result in higher installed capacity levels than 
Q j
m
0 .  The possible trade war outcome then differs in the following period, which causes the lowest self-
enforcing tariff to be non-stationary.
16  To characterize this cooperative tariff path, and show that it 
exhibits gradualism, we first introduce the costs and benefits of adhering to the trade agreement.  To 
develop intuition we restrict attention to the case of complete irreversibility in this section.  We consider 
the more general case and provide a fuller analysis of these costs and benefits in section V.  







c = = = , therefore, when abiding by the trade 








d=dt=dtttt ￿￿￿ .        (13) 
Without loss of generality, suppose that country x is considering a deviation from the trade 
agreement in some period s.  Clearly, the deviating government’s optimal action is given by the Markov-
Nash tariff:  t t s
xm
y s
c Q = ( ) /3.  They receive the deviation payoff for 1 period:  
xdxdccxdxmccccxxmcmc
ssx(s1)syssx(s1)ysssxsys VV(,Q)V((Q()),,Q,Q())V(,,Q,Q()) -- =t=tttt=ttt   (14) 
                                                 
15 An alternative justification for assuming that governments have a low discount factor in trade negotiations is as 
follows.  The infinitely repeated game with discount factor, d, can be considered as a finitely repeated game with a 
constant, and common knowledge, hazard rate that the game continues.  In this interpretation d = he
-rL, where h is 
the hazard rate, r is the rate of time preference and L is the period length.  Staiger (1995, pp. 1520-1521) explains 
that the period length can be thought of as the time required for observing and responding to the trading partner’s 
policies.  He provides compelling logic and some historical evidence that this time requirement is often lengthy, so 
that the government’s discount factor is relatively low.     
16 When N = 0, there are no irreversibilities, the physical environment does not change over time, tariffs are not 
further reduced in later periods, and our model is similar to other repeated games encountered in the literature.   20
We now consider the trade war payoffs.  For concreteness, again consider the payoff to country x 
when their period s deviation precipitated the trade war.  When there is complete irreversibility (N ﬁ ¥), 















  (15) 
For country X, the gain from deviating from the trade agreement in period s is:  
xxccxdxc
ssx(s1)sss (Q,)VV - Y=Yt=-              (16) 









W=Wtd=d- ￿             (17) 
Given the symmetry of the countries, the trade agreement is a sequence of cooperative tariffs {tt









dt ￿￿               (18) 
subject to the constraint that the chosen cooperative tariffs and resulting capacity choices do not cause the 
gain from deviating from the agreement to be greater than the cost of a future trade war. 
iccicc
si(s1)ssi(s1)s (Q,)(Q,,),i{x,y},s -- Yt£Wtd˛" .           (19) 
It is straightforward to verify that world welfare (as defined by equation 18), is a strictly decreasing 
concave function of the tariff rate and, therefore, is maximized by free trade.  The trade agreement, 
therefore, specifies the lowest tariffs that satisfy the incentive constraint given by equation (19). 
Having written the incentive constraint in terms of 
c
i(s1) Q -  and 
c
s t  we graph it in Figures 2 and 3.  
Note that 
i
s Y  is a strictly convex function of 
c
s t .  Figure 2 considers the first period of the agreement, 
when irreversible investment is at the no-trade-agreement level.  We see there that when 
cm
11 t=t , there is 
no gain from deviating and 
i
1 Y  = 0.  Finally, we see that 
i
1 Y  is negatively sloped at this no trade 
agreement tariff.  These points are analytically established in the next section.  We also show there that   21
i
s W  intersects 
i
s Y  twice and that 
i
s W  > 
i
s Y  between these two intersections.  All tariffs in this interval are 
self-enforcing.  The trade agreement coordinates the countries on the Pareto preferred, or lowest, self-
enforcing tariff.  This tariff is denoted as 
c
s t .  One intersection is naturally at 
mm
0 (Q) t .  If d > 1/3, then the 
second intersection is at a lower tariff rate.  Figure 2 also illustrates the result of Proposition 1.  
FIGURES 2 AND 3 GO APPROXIMATELY HERE. 
  It is important to note that, because some tariff reduction is possible, 
m
0 Q  is not an absorbing state 
of this dynamic game.  In Figure 3 we see that if 
iim
10 QQ > , then 
i
2 W  shifts up and 
i
2 Y  shifts down.  This 
slackening of the incentive constraint allows the lowest self-enforcing tariff to drop further in period 2 of 
the trade agreement.  Hence, 
ccm
210 t<t<t .  This tariff drop generates a further increase in irreversible 
capacity so that, by the same mechanism, tariffs are further reduced in each subsequent period.  The 
above analysis is stated concisely in the following claim.  We defer the formal development of a more 
general proposition until the next section.  
CLAIM 1:  If governments value the future enough (d > 1/3), then when starting at the no-trade-
agreement MPE, there exists a self-enforcing cooperative tariff in the first period of a trade agreement 
that is strictly less than t
m m Q ( ) 0 .  In the case of complete irreversibility, this initial tariff is strictly 
positive.  This cooperative tariff generates an increase in the installed capacity that is verifiable at the 
end of the first period that, in turn, generates a further drop in tariffs in the second period.  Tariffs 
continue to drop over time and eventually reach free trade iff d > 3/5. 
V.  Gradualism in a General Case and Comparative Statics 
A.  Cooperation, Deviation, and Trade War Payoffs. 
First consider the value to abiding by the agreement in period s.  Using the common cooperative 
tariff 
c







c = - = + ( ) / , ( ) / . q t q t 2 3 3  
Using equations (8a) and the above demand functions the period utility, equation (9), can be rewritten as:  











ic = + + + ￿ ( ) / ( ) / ( ) /
2 2 2 2 2 2 t  + l = [ ( ) ]/ q t
2 2 3 - t
c  + l.    (20)   22
Note that, along the cooperative path welfare is maximized at free-trade and V
F = q
2 /3 + l.   
Second, consider the payoff to a deviating country X.  The demand for good y in each country 
satisfies:  
xmcymcc
ysysysysd DQ/3;D2Q/3 ==t .  Hence, consumer surplus and tariff revenue in the import 







c 2 2 2 3 18 + ￿ = t .  Export sector consumer surplus 
in the deviating country x is 
xxccc2
xsxsx(s1)s D(AP)/2(Q) - -=+t .  Although capacity is not increased, export 
sector profits are augmented by the improved terms of trade.  From figure 4, we see that deviation period 
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1 1 2 t t .  
Using equations (8b) and (8c) to eliminate 
c
ys Q  and ts
c
-1 from these expressions for consumer surplus, 
tariff revenue, and profits, we can write the deviation period payoff solely as a function of 
c
x(s1) Q -  and 
c
s t : 
      
xdc2cccc22c
sx(s1)x(s1)sx(s1)ss V[189(Q)216Q54Q31()1616]/216 --- =-+￿q￿-￿t￿+t+￿q-￿q￿t  +l.  (21) 
FIGURE 4 GOES APPROXIMATELY HERE. 
Third, consider the future trade war payoffs to country x whose period s deviation generated the 
trade war.  There are three components to these payoffs.  In Chisik (2001) each component is derived in a 
manner similar to the derivation of equation (21).  For the first N-1 periods there is an asymmetric trade 




( ) -1  denoted as 
xmc2cc2
s,N1x(s1)x(s1)s V[51(Q)54Q(2)]/54 --- =-+￿q￿+q-t  + l.  
In the Nth period of the trade war (period s+N), the deviating country x can reduce capacity to Q
m
0 , while 
country y must maintain 
c
ys Q  until the following period: 
xmxmcm2c2 351
Nsx0s 25 VV(,Q)([2])/54 =t=q+q-t  + l.  
The trade war from period s+N+1 on is symmetric with capacities of Q
m
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B.  A Gradual Approach to Free Trade:  The Main Result 
When capacity is reversible after N periods, the one period gain to deviating from the agreement (
i
s Y ) 









W=Wtd=d- ￿ .              (17a) 
We can now state our key result regarding the shape of the incentive constraint. 
Lemma 2:  (a.) 
i
s Y is a strictly convex function of  ts
c  that attains a minimum at 











c Q Q Q
min
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) - - > ‡ 1 1 .  
(b.)  
i
s W is a strictly increasing, and 
i
s Y  is a strictly decreasing, function of  Qi s
c
( ) -1 . 
(c.)  
imc
s0s (Q,,,N) Wtd  intersects 
imc
s0s (Q,) Yt  twice; and 
imc
s0s (Q,,,N) Wtd  > 
imc
s0s (Q,) Yt  between these 
intersections.  One intersection occurs at  t
m m Q ( ) 0  and the other intersection is less than t
m m Q ( ) 0  if d  > 
d0
c N ( )  £  1/3, where d0
c N ( ) is increasing in N and limNﬁ¥ d0
c N ( )  = 1/3. 
(d.)  
imimF
s0s00 (Q,0)(Q,0,,N),(N) Y>Wd"d<d , where d0
F N ( )  is increasing in N and limNﬁ¥ d0
F N ( )  > 1.  
(e.)  
iFiF
ss (Q,0,,N)(Q,0) Wd‡Y  iff  d d ‡
F N ( )  ‡ 3/5, where d
F N ( )  is decreasing in N and   
limNﬁ¥ d
F N ( )  = 3/5. 
The proof of Lemma 2 is contained in Chisik (2001), and is illustrated in Figures 2, 3, 5, 6.
17  
Lemmas 2a and 2c are shown in Figure 5.  By Lemma 2c, if d >  d0
c N ( ) , then there are two intersections 
between 
i
s W  and 
i
s Y .  By Lemma 2a, the minimum of 
i
s Y  occurs at a tariff that is larger than the 
maximum chosen in any equilibrium, therefore, 
i
s Y  has a negative slope at the smaller intersection.  
                                                 
17 The strict concavity of W
i (as illustrated, but never claimed) is not necessary for our results.  What is necessary for 
our results is that Y
i cuts W
i from above at the smaller intersection.  Given Lemmas 2d and 2e and the shape of Y
i 
this is true irrespective of the concavity of W
i.   24
Hence, when starting at the no-trade-agreement MPE, there exists a range of lower tariffs that are 
enforceable, if d >  d0
c N ( ) . 
FIGURES 5 AND 6 GO APPROXIMATELY HERE 
Lemma 2b is illustrated in Figure 3.  It shows that an increase in the state variable, Qi s
c
( ) -1 , shifts 
the 
i
s Y curve down and the 
i
s W  curve up.  Lemma 2d provides a more constructive proof of Proposition 1 
and is described graphically by Figure 2.  Lemma 2e is represented by Figure 6.  We see there that, when 
the state variable is equal to the free-trade capacity level, free trade is enforceable, if governments are 
sufficiently patient.  From Lemma 2d and 2e and the shape of 
i
s Y  we see that 
i
s Y  intersects 
i
s W  from 
above at the lowest root of the quadratic equation 
ii
ss Y=W .  Then from Lemma 2b, an increase in 
installed capacity in the previous period must reduce the lowest enforceable tariff in the current period.  
Finally, from equation (8b) we know that a previous period tariff reduction increases the previous period 
installed capacity.  As a corollary of Lemma 2, with the above mentioned comparative static from 
equation (8b), we immediately obtain our main result. 
Proposition 2:  If governments value the future enough (d  >  d0
c N ( ) ), then when starting at the no-trade-
agreement MPE, there exists a self-enforcing cooperative tariff in the first period of a trade agreement 
that is strictly less than t
m m Q ( ) 0 .  This cooperative tariff generates an increase in the installed capacity 
that is verifiable at the end of the first period that, in turn, generates a further drop in tariffs in the second 
period.  Tariffs continue to drop over time and eventually reach free trade iff d >  d
F N ( ) . 
C. Changes in the Extent of Irreversibility. 
  We now consider how the extent of irreversibility affects the obtainable trade agreement 
outcomes.  A general theme throughout Lemmas 2c, 2d and 2e is that increasing irreversibility makes 
cooperation more difficult when capacity is near the no-trade-agreement level and makes it easier when 
capacity is near the free-trade level.  In particular, Lemma 2c shows that  d0
c N ( )  is increasing in N.  The   25
intuition for this comparative static result is as follows.  A deviating country receives the higher 
asymmetric trade war payoff until capacity can be reversed and receives the lower symmetric no trade 
agreement payoff after that.  An increase in the extent of irreversibility, therefore, decreases the cost of 
starting a trade war so that nations (and firms) act more cautiously.  A corresponding increase in the 
common discount factor is then required to start the liberalization process.  Lemma 2d shows that  d0
F N ( )  
is increasing in N.  The intuition for this result is similar to that for Lemma 2c and is given in section 
IV.A above.  Finally, Lemma 2e shows that  d
F N ( )  is decreasing in N.  When capacity is maximized in 
both countries (and symmetric), an increase in the extent of irreversibility increases the cost of a future 
trade war.  Cooperation is, therefore, easier to sustain and the critical value of the discount rate is reduced.  
The above argument is concisely summarized as: 
Proposition 3:  An increase in the extent of irreversibility makes it harder to start a new trade agreement, 
but makes it easier to sustain a well-established agreement. 
D.  Gradualism and Changes in the Gains From Trade. 
  A cost reducing technological improvement in the exporting country, or a demand increasing 
change in consumer tastes, translates into an increase in our index of the gains from trade (q).  If capacity 
is costlessly and instantly reversible (as in the usual case encountered in the literature), then the effect of q 
on 
c
s t  is ambiguous.  By varying the extent of irreversibility, or the arrival time of the increase in the 
gains from trade, our non-stationary framework allows us to make some non-ambiguous predictions about 
the effect of q on 
c
s t .   
Proposition 4:  An increase in the present and future gains from trade increases 
c
s t , if N is large.  An 
anticipated future increase in the gains from trade decreases the current period 
c
s t , if N is small and 
increases 
c
s t , if N is large.  
Proposition 4 (which is proved in Chisik, 2001) relies on the capacity asymmetries during the first 
part of a trade war.  First, consider the deviation period.  From equation (8) we see that capacity is   26
increasing in q and, consequently, by equation (10) the Markov-Nash tariff also increases in q.  Now, the 
effect of any import tariff (and certainly the Markov-Nash tariff) is to shift a disproportionate amount of 
the gains from trade to the levying country.  Hence, 
i
s Y  is increasing in q.  In a trade war, each country’s 
Markov-Nash tariff usurps some of the gains from trade on their import good.  During the first part of a 
trade war, when there are asymmetries in the irreversible capacity, the country with less irreversible 
capacity expropriates more surplus than is expropriated from them.  The deviating country’s cost of a 
trade war is, therefore, decreasing in q when capacities are asymmetric.  When capacities are symmetric 
(as in the later part of a trade war), each country’s trade war tariff appropriates a symmetric, and 
equivalent, extra measure of the gains from trade in their import market, while reducing the overall level 
of trade.  The value of this lost trade is, naturally, increasing in q and, therefore, so is the cost of a 
symmetric trade war.  Hence, the extent of irreversibility determines the effect of q on the cost of a trade 
war.  When N is large, much of the trade war is asymmetric and 
i
s W  is decreasing in q.  As the extent of 
irreversibility is reduced, more of the trade war is symmetric and 
i
s W  is increasing in q.  Putting this all 
together, we see, from figure 7, that if N is large, then a present and future increase in q must increase 
c
s t .  
FIGURE 7 GOES APPROXIMATELY HERE 
Similarly, an expected future increase in the gains from trade, which alters only 
i
s W , and has no 
effect on 
i
s Y , must raise (lower) the current period 
c
s t , if N is large (small.)  Furthermore, if N is large 
and q increases starting in some period t, then 
c
s t  unambiguously rises in that period and in all future 
periods as well.  Hence, if the extent of irreversibility is high enough, then an increase in the present and 
future gains from trade will raise present and future tariffs and perversely retard the gradualism process.  
E.  The Discount Factor and the Tariff Path. 
In this section we characterize the tariff path as a function of the discount factor.  We do not 
obtain general results and consider only the special case when there is complete irreversibility and when 
free trade is eventually obtained.  In particular, we look at tariffs in the two periods immediately   27
preceding the first period of zero tariffs and analyze the speed of tariff reduction.  Because Qi s
c
( ) -1  is a 
function of ts
c
-1 we can use equation (8b) to write equations (16) and (17a) solely as a function of the 
previous, current and future period cooperative tariffs. 
icciccc
ss1ssi(s1)(s1)s (,)(Q(),) --- Ytt=Ytt               (23) 
icciccc
ss1ssi(s1)(s1)s (,,,N)(Q(),,,N) --- Wttd=Wttd             (24) 
If d > d
F(N), then from Proposition 2 there exists a first period, T, when tariffs are zero and tariffs 
remain at zero for all future periods.  Taking the limit of the incentive constraint in period T as N 




Yt=Wtd .  The smallest root of this quadratic expression is the lowest tariff in 
period T-1 that is consistent with free trade in period T.  After some simplification, this tariff can be 











, where D(1) = d/(1 - d).  There are three 
interesting things to notice about this expression. First, it is increasing in D(1) and, therefore in d.  Hence, 




- < t  0 as 
D( ) 1 >




F(N) = 3/5.  Third, as D(1) goes to infinity, 
c
T1 - t  approaches a limiting value of [14-(60)
1/2]q/34 < 
q/5 =  t0
m.  This again indicates that attaining free-trade takes at least two rounds of tariff reductions.   
Using the above result for 
c
T1 - t , we can rewrite the incentive constraint in period T-1.  This 
incentive constraint implicitly defines 
c
T2 - t  solely as a function of the discount rate.  Proceeding 
recursively we generate the entire gradual tariff path.  The incentive constraint in period T-1 can be 
written as:  
cc idcicc
T1T1 T1T2T1T2
N (,[(1)])lim(,[(1)],,N) -- ----
ﬁ¥ WttD-WttDd.  After some tedious algebra, it is 
possible to show that 
c
T2 - t  is a strictly increasing function of D(1) that is positive iff D(1) ‡ 3/2.    28
Furthermore, 
c m
T2 0 /5 - t£q=t  iff D(1) £ 3.105.  This indicates that if the future is valued highly enough, 
then free trade occurs after two rounds of tariff reductions  If D(1) < 3.105, then free-trade requires at 
least three rounds of tariff reductions.  Finally, 
cc c
T2T1 diff[(1)][(1)][(1)] -- tD=tD-tD is a strictly increasing 
function of D(1) that is positive iff D(1) > 3/2. 
FIGURE 8 GOES APPROXIMATELY HERE 
The above discussion is stated concisely as Proposition 5 which is illustrated in Figure 8 and 
proved in Chisik (2001).
18  Figure 8 plots 
c
T2 [(1)] - tD and 
c
T1 [(1)] - tD for the case of q = 1. 
Proposition 5:  For the case of complete irreversibility, if D(1) ‡ 3/2, then free trade eventually occurs 
and takes at least two rounds of tariff reductions.  If D(1) < 3.105, then it takes at least three rounds of 
tariff reductions.  If the future is valued highly, then incremental tariff reductions are larger and free 
trade occurs more quickly.  As the discount rate is reduced to d
 F(N), the number of tariff reductions 
required to reach free trade become infinite. 
VI.  Conclusion 
In this paper we show that gradualism may arise in international trade agreements in the presence 
of capacity irreversibility and suggest that this capacity irreversibility may also be considered as a proxy 
for many types of trade-partner specific capital.  We first consider the case where capacity is fixed in 
perpetuity and find that free trade, if it occurs, must then be a gradual process.  Even if capacity is 
eventually reversible, then when the future is not sufficiently valued, free trade cannot occur in an initial 
period.  In either case, when free trade is not initially self-enforcing, there exists a self-enforcing tariff 
that is lower than the no trade agreement level.  This initial tariff reduction leads to a small expansion of 
each country’s export sector.  The irreversibility of this expansion changes the incentive constraint in the 
next period and reduces the lowest obtainable self-enforcing tariff in the next period.     29
We next analyze how changes in the extent of capacity irreversibility and in our index of the 
gains from trade effect the tariff path.  We show that an increase in the extent of irreversibility makes it 
more difficult to start a new trade agreement but makes it easier to sustain a well-established one.  We 
also establish that if the extent of irreversibility is sufficiently high, then an increase in the gains from 
trade can perversely retard the gradualism process.  Finally, we characterize the tariff path for the case 
when free trade is eventually enforceable.  As a dynamic counterpart to stationary folk theorem results, 
we show that the speed of liberalization, as given by the size of tariff reductions, is increasing in the 
discount factor. 
A potential limitation of our analysis is related to the extent of sectors covered by the trade 
agreement.  We suggested that the evolution of a single export sector and import tariff can serve as a 
proxy for many differing sectors and tariffs.  Although we believe that this intuition translates to a richer 
model, there are still many unanswered questions.  In particular, how do the degrees of comparative 
advantages and capacity irreversibilities affect the order of sector liberalization and the pace of tariff 
reductions?  Although this topic represents further research we use it to motivate a discussion of the 
bicycle effect. 
As trade relationships mature, they encompass more difficult sectors of the economy and trade 
negotiations are more likely to stall.  In the GATT, and in many regional agreements, these gradually 
longer negotiation rounds always produce some form of last-minute agreement, if no other substantial 
concessions are obtained.  These face-saving compromises are considered symptomatic of what Bhagwati 
(1988) termed the bicycle effect:  If nations stop pedaling on the free-trade-bicycle, then they will fall off.  
That is, if trade negotiations end so that there are no further tariff reductions, then the bicycle effect 
predicts that the current degree of liberalization is no longer enforceable. 
                                                                                                                                                             
18 If the per period capacity costs are considered solely as loan repayment, then capacity decisions are a function of 
the discount rate and the analysis in Proposition 5 is less clear.  Hence, Proposition 5 is only technically valid when 
capacity costs stem from explicit and implicit contractual obligations.  I would like to thank Rick Bond for bringing 
this point to my attention.     30
In our model, this corresponds to a cessation of all negotiations and, therefore, all further tariff 
reductions beginning in some period, s.  With the expected tariff 
c e
s1 t - t‡t  for all future t, we then ask if 
c
s1 - t  is enforceable in period s.  
There are two opposing effects at work here.  The first is the termination of the anticipated 
reduction in future cooperative tariffs.  If these tariffs do not drop over time, then the cost of a trade war 
decreases.  By itself, this effect increases ts and it suggests that the current tariff cannot be maintained.  
The other effect is the increase in irreversible capacity in period s-1.  This second effect mitigates the 
first effect so that the overall effect on ts is ambiguous and ts = 
c
s1 - t  is possible.  When the irreversibility 
constraint is no longer binding the second effect is irrelevant and tariffs must increase.  The extent of 
irreversibility determines how long the bicycle can be balanced while not pedaling forward.  Once 
capacity is reversible it must topple over.
19 
This result suggests that the bicycle effect is more pronounced in newer trading relationships or 
when countries are less integrated with their trading partners.  Although not modeled here, it is possible 
that more established trading relationships permit trade-partner-specific investments with a greater extent 
of irreversibility.  These more established relationships can, therefore, more easily withstand the 
occasional disagreements and stalemates that must be avoided when nurturing younger, more fragile 
relationships. 
 
                                                 
19 It is instructive to compare our discussion of the bicycle effect with the results contained in Staiger (1995) and 
Furusawa and Lai (1999).  In all three papers the (tariff raising) loss of future liberalization gains must be contrasted 
with the (tariff lowering) change in the state variable.  This tariff-raising effect dominates in Staiger (except in the 
final period of liberalization) and there is evidence of a bicycle effect.  In Furusawa and Lai, in the event of a trade 
war, workers must pay an additional adjustment cost to re-enter the import-competing sector they just left, which 
increases the state variable (tariff-lowering) effect and they find no evidence of the bicycle effect.  In our 
framework, as long as capacity is irreversible the dominating effect on tariffs is dependant on our parameterization.  
The key difference in our model is that irreversibility ends after N periods, so that the state variable effect vanishes 
and the bicycle effect is eventually evidenced.         31
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Appendix A:  Proofs.  (Available by request.) 
 
Proof of Lemma 1:  (i.)  In any period in which capacity was not expanded in the previous N periods, as 
well as in the initial period, the irreversibility constraint is not binding, so that Qjt = Qjt
im () τ .  The 
physical environment is identical and, therefore, the possible MPE outcomes are identical in each such 
period.  Substituting τ 0
im = Qj0 / 3 into equation (8a) yields Qj0
m  = Qj() τ 0
im = 3θ  / 5.  This capacity implies 
a tariff of τ 0
im =ττ 00 0
im
j
im Q (() ) =   θ  / 5.  Expecting the same tariff in each subsequent period, firms neither 
desire to add or reduce capacity and, therefore, the Markov-Nash tariff is the same in each subsequent 
period.  Hence, these initial tariff and capacity pairs constitute a MPE in each subsequent period as well. 
(ii.)  After any other history, with Qjs ≥  Qj0
m , it must be the case that τ js
ie  ≤  τ 0
im .  Expecting a 
Markov-Nash tariff in, say, period s+1, the desired capacity becomes Q j(( ) ) () τ s
im
js Q + 1  ≤  Qjs.  Firms, 
therefore, do not add capacity and Q j(s+1)
m = Qjs, which implies a tariff of τ () s
im
+ 1  = Qjs / 3 ≥  Qj0
m / 3.  Using 
the same argument as in the proof of part (i), these tariff and capacity pairs constitute a MPE in each 
subsequent period t ∈  {s + 2,…,s + N}.   
 
Derivation of Trade War Payoffs for the Deviating Country 
In the trade war generated by country x’s deviation, country x continues to levy a Markov-Nash 
tariff, therefore, their import sector consumer surplus and tariff revenue during the trade war is the same 
as in the deviation period.  Country x’s exports now face a Markov-Nash tariff and their export sector 





2 24 1 8 = − .  Producer surplus (for the first N–1 periods) is 
slightly more complicated, because the desired industry capacity for competitive profit-maximizing firms 
facing the trade-war prices is less than the actual industry capacity.  In Figure 4 we denote  ! Qxt
m  as the 
desired capacity for the given price (P B Q xt
xm
xt
m =+ ! )  Producer surplus in a trade war is then given by:  











m ⋅− − −⋅ − −− 22 11 .  Using equations (6) and (10) it is easy to see that:  
! [] / () QQ xt
m
xs
c =− − 32 3 1 θ .  Furthermore, using equations (6) and (10) and then (8b) yields: 














() () () () () [] / [ ] / [ ] / −− − − − −=− = − = − 11 1 1 1 23 6 5 3 3 ττ τ θ .  Substituting these equations  
into equation (9) and then using equation (8c) to make a substitution for 
c
ys Q  yields period utility for the 
first N–1 periods of the trade war as:  
xm c 2 c c 2
s,N 1 x(s 1) x(s 1) s V[ 5 1 ( Q ) 5 4 Q ( 2) ] / 5 4 −− − =− + ⋅ θ ⋅ + θ − τ  + " for t ∈  
{s+1,…, s+N− 1}.  In period N of the trade war capacity is not constrained in the deviating country and   A-2 
the above equation can be written with Q
m
0  in place of Qxs
c
() − 1  yielding:  
xm xm c m 2 c 2 351
Ns x 0 s 25 VV ( , Q ) ( [ 2 ] ) / 5 4 =τ = θ + θ − τ  + ", for t = s+N.  After period N of the trade war capacity is 
unconstrained in both countries and the above equation can be written with τθ 0 5
m = / in place of τ s
c .  We 







2 == (, ) τθ + " for t > s+N.  The trade war payoffs can then be written as:  




























where ∆ (t) ≡  δ
t/(1-δ ) is introduced to simplify notation.  We show in appendix B that ∆ (t) is decreasing in 
t, increasing in δ  and , for t′  > t, ∆ (t, t′ ) = ∆ (t) −  ∆ (t′ ) is increasing in δ .   
 
Proof of Lemma 2:   First, using equations (20) and (21) we can rewrite equation (16) as:  
xc 2 c c c 2 c c 2
s x(s 1) x(s 1) s x(s 1) s s [ 189(Q ) 216 Q 54 Q 56 16 103( ) ]/216 −− − Ψ = − + ⋅ θ ⋅− ⋅ τ ⋅− θ − ⋅ θ ⋅ τ + τ . 
Substituting the above components of 
xw
s V  into equation (22) and combining with equation (20) we can 
rewrite equation (17) as:  
(
)
x2 c 2 c 2
sx ( s 1 ) x ( s 1 )
cc 2 t s c 2
ss t
ts1
[350 1275(Q ) 1350 Q ] (1,N) [19 (N 1) (1)]





Ω= θ+ − ⋅ θ ⋅ ∆ + ∆ + − ∆ θ
+⋅ θ ⋅ τ − τ ∆+ − δ τ∑
 










c Q ≤= ≤ − () // 1 32 9  i n  a n y  
equilibrium.  We use these bounds on Qis
c
() − 1  and τ s




i(s 1) s 216 c
s
[ 54Q 16 206 ] 0 −
∂Ψ
=− − θ +τ <
∂τ
.   
To see that Ω s
id is convex in τ s
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Argmin 
ic c

















i(s 1) s c
i(s 1)
1









                                                 
1 The intuition for this important result is as follows. An increase in τ
c has no effect on capacity in the deviating 
country, but decreases capacity in the surprised country.  For this reason, Ω
i is initially increasing in τ
c.  Similarly, 
Ψ
i is increasing in irreversible capacity in the surprised country and is, therefore, decreasing in τ
c.  That V
w is 
decreasing, and, therefore, that Ω
i is increasing, in Q(s-1) is the main point of the paper and has been explained   A-3 




0 , τ s
c , δ , N) −  
im c
s0 s (Q , ) Ψτ  = {[100∆ (N+1) −  1900∆ (1) −  2575](τ s
c )
2 +  
[400∆ (1, N+1) + 1210]θτ s
c  + [76∆ (N+1) −  4∆ (1) −  139]θ
2}/5400.    (AP1) 
The above quadratic form is strictly concave in τ s
c , therefore, if it has two roots, then it is positive 
between the roots.  Solving for the roots yields 
τ s
c = 
139 4 1 76 1
515 380 1 20 1
103 76 1 4 1





















The larger root is equal to τ
mm Q () 0  = θ /5 and the smaller root is smaller than θ /5 if: 
2δ
N+1 +3δ  −   1   >   0 .               ( A P 2 )  
Solving AP2 with equality implicitly defines a δ 0
c N ( ).  Hence, because AP2 is strictly increasing 
in δ , it is satisfied for all δ  > δ 0
c N () .  Because the implicit expression for δ 0
c N ()  satisfies the conditions 
for the implicit function theorem, we have ∂δ 0
c() ⋅ /∂ N = − [2δ
N+1ln(δ )]/[(N+1)2δ
N + 3] > 0.  Furthermore, 
limN→∞ [2δ
N+1 +3δ  −  1] = 3δ  −  1, so that limN→∞ δ 0
c N ()  = 1/3. 
As it turns out, static expectations overestimates δ 0
c N ( ).  If gradualism is expected  
(τ t > τ t+1, ∀ t), then the first term in the above quadratic (AP1) is smaller in absolute value and the lower 
root takes on a smaller value, therefore, the lower bound of δ  that permits tariff reductions is less than our 
derived δ 0





0 , 0) = 139θ





0 , 0, δ , N) iff 
139 −  135δ  −  76δ
N+1 > 0.  (Note that this expression can also be derived by setting the smaller root of AP1 
less than zero.)  Solving this polynomial with equality implicitly defines a δ 0
F N ( ) .  Because this 
polynomial is decreasing in δ , it is, therefore, satisfied for all δ  < δ 0
F N () . Again, the implicit function 
theorem can be used to show that ∂δ 0
F() ⋅ /∂ N = − [− 76δ
N+1ln(δ )]/[− 76(N+1)δ
N −  135] > 0.  Furthermore, 
                                                                                                                                                             
elsewhere.  What is less obvious is that V
d, and therefore Ψ
i, is decreasing in Q(s-1).  This last derivative is small in 
magnitude, (and if it vanished it would have no effect on our results), however, the reason for its occurrence is 
interesting and can be described as follows.  The competitive firms fail to internalize the negative external effect that 
their increased output has on the export market price and, therefore, produce more than the welfare maximizing 
quantity.  (Hence, an export tax is the optimal policy for a competitive export industry.)  This occurs even when 
exports are minimized as in the no-trade-agreement MPE.  Although tariff reductions increase profits, they shift a 
greater percentage of output towards the export market.  This second, indirect effect is more pronounced when 
output is larger so that Ψ
i is decreasing in Q(s-1).   A-4 
limN→∞ [139 −  135δ  −  76δ
N+1] = 139−  135δ , so that limN→∞ δ 0





0 , 0) = 139θ





0 , 0, δ , N). 
(e) 
iF
s(Q ,0, ,N) Ωδ = [50 ∆ (1) −  53∆ (N) + 57 ∆ (N+1)]θ
2/4050 ≥  θ
2/54 = 
iF
s(Q ,0) Ψ  iff 125δ  −  
53δ
N +57δ
N+1 −  75 ≥  0.  Now this polynomial is increasing in δ , so it is satisfied for all δδ ≥
F N () , where 
δ
F N ()  satisfies this polynomial with equality.  When N approaches ∞ , δ
F N ()  approaches 3/5 and when 
N= 0, δ
F N ( )  = 128/182.  The conditions for the implicit function theorem are again satisfied so that 
∂δ
F() ⋅ /∂ N = − [(57δ
N+1 −  53δ
N)ln(δ )]/[125 + 57(N+1)δ
N −  53Nδ
N+1] < 0 iff δ
F N ( )  < 53/57, which is true 
by the previous sentence.  
 
Proof of Proposition 4:  The proof consists of noting the effect of θ  on 
i
s Ω  and on 
i




 = {[700θ  −  1350Qis
c
() − 1 ]∆ (1, N) + [100τ s





 = [700θ  −  1350Qis
c
() − 1  + 100τ s
c ]∆ (1)/1350 < 0. 
When capacity is instantly reversible (N = 0), the cost of a trade war is  







































}/1350 < 0.  This last result occurs, 
because ∂∆ (t)/∂ t = ∆ (t)ln(δ ) ≤  0 and δ  ≤  1.  Hence, there exists a critical value of N, which is strictly 
positive, such that 
i
s Ω  is increasing (decreasing) in θ  as N is below (above) this critical value.  






() − 1  −  112θ  −  16τ s
c ]/216 > 0, so that 
i
s Ψ  is increasing in θ .  
Referring to Figure 7 immediately yields the statement of the Proposition.   
 
Proof of Proposition 5:  First, note that 
ic ic
TT 1 TT 1 N (, 0 ) l i m(, 0 , , N ) −− →∞ Ψτ − Ωτ δ =  




1 −− + + + ≤ −− ∆∆ ∆ θτ θ τ T
c
T











.     A-5 
21 / 2
c
T1 22 1 / 2
5(1593 1488 (1) [270 330 (1) 60 (1) ] )
()/ ( 1 ) 0
[63 68 (1) ][270 330 (1) 60 (1) ]
−
+∆ ++ ∆ + ∆





T1 (( 1 ) ) − τ∆ at ∆ (1) = 3/2 yields 2[9 + 14(3/2) −  (270 +330(3/2) +60(3/2)
2)
1/2]θ /[63 + 68(3/2)] = 
2[30 −  30]/165 = 0.  For the third claim regarding 
c
T1 − τ , note that 
c
T1
(1) lim (14 60) /34 −
∆→ ∞ τ= − θ . 
The proofs of the claims regarding τ T
c
− 2  are straightforward, however, they require manipulation 
of very lengthy derivatives and are omitted.  They are available on request from the author.     B-1 
Appendix B:  Deviation Period Capacity Decisions.  (Available by request.) 
  In this appendix, we analyze the deviation period capacity choices of firms when their options are 
not limited by institutional constraints.  This capacity is denoted by Qs = Max {Q
D, Q(s-1)}, where Q
D is 
the desired capacity in the deviation period when there are no institutional or irreversibility constraints.  
We now investigate Q
D to discover when it is greater than Q(s-1).  If firms add capacity in the deviation 
period, then the industry marginal revenue is (2A − Q
D − τs
c )/2 in the deviation period and ∆(1, N)(2A − 
Q
D − Q
D/3)/2 for the first N periods of the trade war, where ∆(1, N) = ∆(1) − ∆(N) = (δ − δ
N)/(1 − δ) is 
introduced to economize on notation. The intertemporal industry marginal revenue from this capacity 
expansion is, therefore, equal to (6A[1 + ∆(1, N)] − 3τs
c  − Q
D[3 + 4∆(1, N)])/6.  The intertemporal 
industry marginal cost is (1 + ∆(1, N))(B + Q
D).  Equating the intertemporal marginal revenue to the 
intertemporal marginal cost yields:  Q
D = [6θ(1 + ∆(1, N)) − 3τs
c ]/[9 + 10∆(1, N)]. 
It is straightforward to verify that: 
(a.)  ∂Q
D/∂τs
c  = − 3/[9 + 10∆(1, N)] < 0; 
(b.)  ∂Q
D/∂∆(1, N) = [−6θ + 30τs
c ]/[9 + 10(∆(1, N)]
2 ≤ 0; (because τs
c  ≤ θ/5) 
(c.)  ∂∆(N)/∂N = ∆(N)ln(δ) ≤ 0; (because δ ≤ 1) 
(d.)  ∂∆(1, N)/∂N = − ∆(N)ln(δ) ≥ 0;  
(e.)  ∂∆(N)/∂δ = [Nδ
N−1 − (N − 1)δ
N]/(1 − δ)
2 ≥ 0;  
(f.)  ∂∆(N+1)/∂δ − ∂∆(N)/∂δ = Nδ
N−1[2δ − δ
2 − 1]/(1 − δ)
2 ≤ 0; (because 2δ − δ
2 − 1 ≤ 0 for all δ ∈ [0, 1] 
(g.)  ∂∆(1, N)/∂δ ≥ 0; (because the result in part f holds for all N) 
(h.) ∂Q
D/∂N) = [∂Q
D/∂∆(1, N)]∂∆(1, N)/∂N ≤ 0; (from parts b and d) 
(i.)  ∂Q
D/∂δ) = [∂Q
D/∂∆(1, N)]⋅∂∆(1, N)/∂δ ≤ 0; (from parts b and g). 
Now, firms do not desire to add capacity in the deviation period if Q
D ≤ Q(s−1), which is equivalent 
to:  (δ − δ
N)/(1 − δ) = ∆(1, N) ≥ [6θ − 9Q(s−1) − 3τs
c ]/[10Q(s−1) − 6θ] = [3/2][τ() s
c
−1 −τs
c ]/[5Q(s−1) − 3θ].   
  Hence, even in the absence of an institutional constraint, firms do not desire to add capacity in the 




c ) is large, or if capacity is much above the no trade agreement level.  
  Finally, Proposition 2 shows that if no institutional constraint exists and the deviating country 
does add capacity in the deviation period, then Ωs
id  shifts down and Ωs
ic  shifts up.  In this case, tariff 
reductions still occur, however, their magnitude increases and tariffs drop at a faster rate.      
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If N is large and θ
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